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Cost Containment in Workers' Compensation: 
Evaluating Medical Fee Schedules 
David L. Durbin and Barry I. Llewellyn* 
Abstract 
Medical expenditures in workers' compensation programs have been subjected 
to few cost containment strategies. As workers' compensation costs have es-
calated, however, increasing attention is being given to the role of medical fee 
schedules in containing the prices of medical services. To this end, we develop 
a model for estimating the potential cost savings from implementing medical 
fee schedules. A market basket of medical services received by injured workers 
is constructed. This basket is used to estimate the parameters of the model. In 
addition, the basket is used to determine the impact of imposing a fee sched-
ule linked to usual and customary charges or to the Medicare resource-based 
relative value schedule (RBRVS). 
Key words and phrases: basket, current procedural terminology, resource-based 
relative value schedule (RBRVS) 
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1 Introduction 
The continuing rise in medical expenditures has led to significant 
public policy interest in methods to contain costs. Approximately $900 
billion was spent on health care in the United States in 1993, slightly 
more than 14 percent of the United States' gross domestic product 
(Burnier, Waldo, and McKusick, 1992). Total health care expenditures 
have grown more than 10 percent per year over the past decade. Growth 
rates in expenditures also have been significant for the various social 
insurance programs where medical care either is funded directly by gov-
ernment programs (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare) or mandated by public 
policy (e.g., workers' compensation and private passenger automobile 
insurance). 
For example, the medical cost portion of workers' compensation in-
surance, with payments of more than $20 billion in 1992, is estimated to 
have increased one and one-half times faster than health expenditures 
generally (Nelson, 1992). The absence of formal cost containment pro-
grams in workers' compensation may have contributed to this increase. 
As medical benefits under workers' compensation insurance are es-
sentially unlimited first dollar coverage1 with virtually no restrictions on 
covered services, there have been few opportunities for cost sharing. 2 
Cost-sharing programs have been used widely to contain group and in-
dividual health insurance costs. Newhouse, Phelps, and Marquis (1980) 
and Jacobs (1991) have shown that consumers (patients) of health care 
are price conscious, i.e., they respond to economic incentives provided 
through the price of care.3 This suggests that there is a downward 
sloping demand for medical care. 
As with every other form of medical care, there has been increased 
attention paid to workers' compensation medical costs. There have 
been two main avenues by which cost containment traditionally has 
been pursued. The first involves setting fee limits on the speCific medi-
cal services provided. Twenty-eight states currently have formal medi-
cal fee schedules in place regulating the price per service performed by 
I Unlimited first dollar coverage refers to coverage with no copayments, deductibles, 
or policy limits. 
20ver the past year or two, a couple of states have removed the prohibition on 
cost sharing in limited circumstances (e.g., where medical care is provided by a man-
aged care network and the claimant has reached the point of maximum medical 
improvemen t.) 
3Research from the Rand health experiment estimates that the price elasticity of 
demand for health (when consumers have less than a 25 percent co-pay) is -0.2; thus, 
for a 10 percent increase in price to the consumer, consumption will fall 2 percent. 
Increases in the co-insurance rate also are found to affect consumption. 
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medical providers for care rendered to injured workers (Telles, 1993). 
The second involves restricting the injured worker's choice of physi-
cian. The premise is that employers, who are financially responsible 
for providing medical benefits to injured workers, will have incentives 
to seek the most cost efficient medical providers. Twenty-two states 
currently allow employer selection of medical provider, and 41 states 
have restrictions on switching providers once an initial selection has 
been made (Telles, 1993). 
The effectiveness of fee schedules and choice of physician on work-
ers' compensation medical costs may vary. It is clear from the little 
available research that each individual state program must be evalu-
ated on its own merit. (See Durbin (1993) for a review.) Savings from 
these cost containment strategies have been observed, but the extent 
of such savings appears to depend on the individual state's circum-
stances. In some situations savings may not be achieved. But there is 
continued interest in fee schedules and choice of physician as policy-
makers, insurers, and consumers seek ways to contain cost increases. 
Over the past year or so, more than 20 states have considered either 
changing their existing fee schedules or implementing new medical fee 
schedules. 
This paper presents the methodology used by the National Coun-
cil on Compensation Insurance (NCCI)4 for evaluating the cost effec-
tiveness of medical fee schedules in workers' compensation insurance. 
The data are based on the data provided to the NCCI for the evalua-
tion of almost 100 different fee schedule proposals between January 
1993 to April 1994. Several models are developed for estimating the 
potential cost savings for different types of fee schedules including the 
relatively new strategy of linking fees in workers' compensation to the 
Medicare5 resource-based relative value schedule. We also discuss the 
development of a basket of medical services received by injured work-
ers. Several common scenarios are presented as case studies. We con-
clude with a discussion of how estimated medical provider cost savings 
derived from fee schedules ultimately may affect the overall workers' 
compensation system's costs. 
4The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) is a nonprofit data gath-
ering, research, and ratemaking organization. NCCI compiles statistics on workers' 
compensation and provides advisory rates or information to be used for establishing 
rates in 32 states. It also serves as statistical advisor in about half of the remain-
ing states. NCCI is responsible for estimating the impact of workers' compensation 
reforms, including fee schedules, in some 40 jurisdictions. 
sMedicare is an United States social security program that provides health insurance 
protection for almost all Americans age 65 and over. 
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2 Fee Schedules 
There are three general methods for establishing medical provider 
(as distinct from hospital or clinic) fee schedules: (i) fees may be set at 
some percentile of the usual and customary reimbursement rate (UCR); 
(ii) fees may be targeted at some multiple of the resource-based relative 
value schedule (RBRVS); and (iii) fees may be targeted at some multi-
ple of another benchmark schedule (e.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield). 
Any of these schedules may use specific information on actual charged 
amounts or, similar to RBRVS, they may use conversion factors to trans-
late information on the relative resource use into dollar amounts. Some 
states use a combination of methods. 
There are a number of factors that influence the design and con-
struction of any fee or reimbursement schedule. The major objective 
is to contain costs through managing the price per service. Secondary 
objectives include equity (all patients/claimants charged the same for 
similar service) and administrative efficiency. Eccleston, Grannemann, 
and Dunleavy (1993) provide a comprehensive review of the design of 
workers' compensation fee schedules and provide interstate compar-
isons concerning these issues. In addition to the principal considera-
tion of cost savings, they identify the following major design issues: 
speCific levels of reimbursement and the basis for determining relative 
payment for procedures; coverage of providers and services; and pro-
visions for updating prices. The study of such issues, while important, 
is beyond the scope of this paper as these questions are basically pub-
lic policy issues. This paper deals with the evaluation of various fee 
schedules after they are designed. 
Perhaps the most influential innovation in medical fee schedules 
has been the introduction of the RBRVS for Medicare. Designed by re-
searchers at Harvard University the conceptual underpinning is straight-
forward: prices per service are designed to reflect the real resources 
(including time, equipment, and physician training) needed to perform 
the service. These relative values are adjusted for geographical dif-
ferences in the cost of living. Thus, in essence, RBRVS is designed to 
reallocate resources among providers while retaining, at least as a first 
step, revenue neutrality.6 
A mUltiplicative factor of the RBRVS often is used in workers' com-
pensation. The rationale is that if Medicare is able to offer neces-
6For a brief overview of RBRVS, see Hsiao et al. (1988) or (lg90a). For more detailed 
information, see Hsiao et al. (l990b), or write to Professor William C. Hsiao, Harvard 
University, School of Public Health, 1350 Massachusetts Ave., Room 726, Cambridge 
MA 02138, USA. 
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sary and quality care, then this provides information on the minimum 
achievable price. Two states have implemented RBRVS for their work-
ers' compensation systems (Pennsylvania and Vermont), while several 
other states have or currently are contemplating such an approach.? 
3 Evaluation Issues 
Evaluating the impact of the imposition of a physician fee schedule 
is conceptually a straightforward exercise. In general, all fee sched-
ules, regardless of the type of schedule, specify a maximum allowable 
charge for each service rendered by a medical provider.8 Services typi-
cally are identified by the current procedural terminology (CPT) guide-
lines published by the American Medical Association. The list of CPTs 
is extensive. For example, there are individual codes for different of-
fice visits (initial examination, follow-up visits), different surgical proce-
dures (arthoscopy, laminectomy), medical tests, and physical therapy. 
There are five broad categories (medicine, physical mediCine, radiol-
ogy, surgery, and pathology) containing hundreds of individual service 
or CPT codes.9 
3.1 Percent of Usual and Customary 
To estimate the statewide impact of imposing a fee schedule limiting 
the maximum allowable charge for each service requires three pieces of 
information: (i) information on the fee schedule amount for each CPT 
code; (ii) information on the amount that would have been charged for 
this CPT code in the absence of the fee schedule; and (iii) information on 
the distribution of services or the distribution of expenditures. Let n be 
the set of all different medical services (CPT codes) relevant to treating 
injured workers; Wi be the premedical fee schedule expenditure weight 
or proportion of costs of the ith procedure in a given state; Fi be the 
fee schedule or maximum reimbursement amount for the ith service; 
and U be a measure of the usual and customary reimbursement rate 
7It is interesting to note that the American Medical Association recently supported 
the Medicare RBRVS approach as an alternative to price restrictions considered in the 
current health care debates in the United States. 
8Medical providers typically are defined by state statute. They include physicians, 
chiropractors, physical therapists, osteopaths, nurses, etc. 
9There is actually a sixth category for anesthesia. Anesthesia often is billed per unit 
of time, however, which complicates data reporting and analysis of reimbursement 
levels. 
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(UCR) for the ith service. The savings (S) can be represented as: 
S= L Wi(Ui-Fi). 
iEo' Vi 
(1) 
Note that in this formulation, if a particular service is not identified by 
a CPT code or if no schedule is specified (commonly referred to as a BR 
or by report), then F is assumed equal to V and no saving is attributed. 
Stated differently, the empirical estimation of the maximum potential 
savings is a weighted average calculation where the weights are the 
proportions of total costs spent on each individual procedure. 
Alternatively, S may be estimated as: 
S = LiEO,Ni(Ui - Fi) (2) 
LiEO,NiVi 
where Ni = the number of times the ith procedure is performed in a 
given state. The approach of equation (2) amounts to taking the differ-
ence between the total costs charged to all injured workers for a service 
before the fee schedule and the expected total costs after imposing the 
schedule as a proportion of total costs prior to the fee schedule. lO 
The computation of S requires extensive data, which often do not 
exist. With the exception of a few states that collect data on all services 
performed on injured workers, information on the number or distribu-
tion of services is not readily available. Similarly, aggregate expenditure 
information is generally not available. In many circumstances, little or 
no state-specific data are available. The difficulty in getting the appro-
priate data arises from the nature of workers' compensation claims. 
Each claim may consist of multiple treatments lasting a long period of 
time (Le., a claim is defined as the entire disability period). In contrast, 
group and individual health insurance define a claim to be a single visit 
to a medical provider. 
In order to estimate the savings poteT\tial from imposing a fee sched-
ule in instances where there is little information, NCC! uses the concept 
of a basket.!l The NCCI basket has been compiled from five separate 
lOImplicit in equations (1) and (2) is the simplifying assumption that the demand, the 
supply, and the distribution of medical services will not be altered by the imposition 
of a price ceiling (the fee schedule). As will be discussed later, there is strong evidence 
that challenges the appropriateness of this assumption. Violating this assumption has 
important implications for estimating the impact on total provider costs of imposing 
price limits per service. 
liThe NCCI basket consists of a relatively small group of services that commonly is 
used in treating injured workers. It is analogous to the basket used by economists to 
construct price indexes such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Baskets have the advan-
tage of providing reasonable approximations to the actual distribution or consumption 
of services without the prohibitive expense of massive data collection. 
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data sources containing information from 26 states with workers' com-
pensation fee schedules. The data are derived from both private and 
government data sources and relate to medical services rendered be-
tween 1989 and 1991.12 Over 800 different CPT codes are represented; 
the NCCI basket combines the individual frequency data from all five 
sources into a aggregate frequency distribution. The basket is effec-
tively a weighted average frequency distribution that provides the num-
ber and proportion of each service or CPT. 
As noted above, the actual saving from a new fee schedule is the 
weighted sum of savings per service, with the weights provided by the 
basket. Because, by definition, the fee schedule provides the maximum 
reimbursement rate, the remaining piece of information relates to the 
current level of charges. Once the current distribution of charges and 
the frequency distribution of services are known, it is easy to calculate 
the total amount of reimbursements. Substituting the fee schedule lev-
els for the UCR,13 it is again straightforward to calculate the expected 
reimbursements under the fee schedule. Using the basket, the esti-
mated savings, sib), are given by14 
'" (b)( ) S(b) _ L.iEO(b) Ni Ui - Fi 
1 - IiEO(b) Nib) Ui (3) 
where n(b) is the set of services (CPT codes) in the NCCI basket; and 
Nfb) = the number of times the ith procedure in the basket is per-
formed. 
For example, Tables Al and A2 (in the appendix) show an abbrevi-
ated hypothetical example of these calculations. Table Al shows sav-
ings calculations by CPT. For the illustrated CPT codes, the following 
is shown: the NCCI frequency distribution or basket; the fee schedule 
level; the percentile of the UCR distribution where the fee schedule falls; 
the average of the UCR distribution up to the fee schedule level; and the 
average of the UCR. Based on these statistics, estimates of costs under 
both the current and new fee schedules and the estimated savings are 
shown. 
The estimate of the new cost (NCi b ») is: 
Ndb) = p~b) N~b) AVC(b) + (1 - p(b) )N(b) FS~b) for i E n(b) (4) 
t t t t t t t 
12Because the CPT codes change periodically, the CPTs from earlier years are adjusted 
to reflect the CPT schedule as of 1991. 
13Data for the UCR, if not available from state agencies, often can be obtained from 
private medical bill audit vendors. 
14Throughout this paper the superscript (b) notation is used to denote quantities 
calculated using only those services that are in the NCCI basket. 
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where, for i E n(b), we have Nib) = frequency distribution of service i; 
pjb) = proportion of VCR that is less than the fee schedule's charge for 
service i; AVG~b) = average charge of all charges that are less than the 
fee schedule's charge for service i; and Fsfb) = fee schedule amount for 
service i. 
Table A2 summarizes the individual CPT calculations that yield the 
estimate of the overall system savings. In the example shown, the fee 
schedule is calculated to save 18.65 percent on total provider costs, 
with a range from 13.58 percent for the general medicine group to 37.58 
percent for pathology. These represent estimates of the maximum po-
tential savings on provider costs based on the restrictive assumption 
that the distribution of services will remain fixed. 
3.2 Impact on Overall System Costs 
In order to translate the impact of any fee schedule savings on physi-
cian costs to total workers' compensation system savings, two other 
pieces of information are needed. First, provider costs are only one 
component of overall medical costs. There are medical costs associ-
ated with at least two other broad categories: inpatient hospitalization 
and pharmaceuticals. Second, workers' compensation costs generally 
are separated into medical and indemnity (weekly disability benefits) 
components. Thus, information is needed on the proportion of medi-
cal costs that are provider-related and on the split between indemnity 
and medical benefits. 
Table A2 provides information on the proportion of medical costs 
that are physician-related and the medical/indemnity split for the hy-
pothetical example. In this example, physician costs are 48.4 percent 
of medical costs and medical costs are 58.0 percent of total costs. 
Thus, the estimated 18.65 percent savings on physician costs translates 
into a maximum workers' compensation system savings of 5.2 percent 
(0.0524 = 0.1865 x 0.4841 x 0.580). 
NCC! has compiled information on the distribution of medical costs. 
These costs are split into three general categories based on information 
from four sources lS and are shown in Table A3. Based on the averages 
from the available data sources, medical costs are distributed as fol-
lows: 48.4 percent are physician costs; 47.6 percent are hospital costs; 
and 4 percent are other costs (including pharmaceuticals). 
lSInformation on the sources and the data on the distribution of medical costs are 
available from the authors. 
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3.3 RBRVS Evaluation 
Evaluation of the potential impact of imposing the RBRVS in a partic-
ular state (or geographical region) requires essentially the same method-
ology as discussed in Section 3.1. The only difference is that the RBRVS 
must be converted into a maximum reimbursement amount for each 
CPT. Only after this conversion can comparisons be made to the cur-
rent level of reimbursements in the market. The determination of the 
RBRVS amount for a particular CPT code for a given locale within a 
state requires that the values of three RBRVS parameters be known. 
The three RBRVS parameters are: 
1. The conversion factor (CP) for the CPT code. There are three dif-
ferent conversion factors used for all states in 1994: $35.158 for 
CPT codes designated as surgical; $33.718 for CPT codes desig-
nated as primary care services; and $32.905 for nonsurgical ser-
vices. 
2. The relative value units (RVU) for the CPT code. The RVU for a 
given CPT is the same in all states. There are three RVUs for each 
code: a work RVU (RVUw ); a practice expense RVU (RVUp ); and a 
malpractice RVU (RVUm ). 
3. The geographic practice cost index (GPCI) values that are speCific 
to regions within a state. There are three GPCIs for each region: a 
work index (GPCIw ); a practice expense index (GPCI p ); and a mal-
practice index (GPCIm ). The GPCI for any region is used for all CPT 
codes and is used to transform the national RVUs into local RVUs. 
Let R be the RBRVS maximum payment for a CPT in a specific region; 
then 
RBRVS = [(RVUw x GPCIw ) + (RVUp x GPCIp ) (5) 
+ (RVUm x GPCIm )] x CP. 
Tables A4 and A5 show these calculations for selected CPTs in a hypo-
thetical state with three regions. Once these values are calculated, it is 
straightforward to compare them to current costs to estimate potential 
cost savings. 
3.4 Updates to Existing Fee Schedules 
The same methodology as outlined above may be used to evaluate 
updates or changes to existing fee schedules. Data availability issues 
90 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 
are not as pressing, because information will be readily available on 
both the old and new fee schedules. Equation (3) can be modified by 
replacing the measure of the VCR with the old fee schedule reimburse-
ment level. Savings S?) are estimated as a weighted average as before, 
i.e., 
" . N(b) (F(old) _ F~new») 
S(b) _ L.tEQ(b) itt (6) 
2 - " N(b)F(old) 
L.iEQ(b) i i 
where Fi(Old) and Fi(new) are the old and new service i fee schedules, 
respectively. 
4 Utilization Issues 
Economic theory and empirical research suggest that the demand, 
supply, and distribution of services will not remain fixed after imple-
mentation of a fee schedule. Microeconomic theory predicts that the 
imposition of fee schedules (price ceilings) for medical services will re-
sult in an increased demand for services and a reduction in the supply of 
these services. To meet this pent-up demand, substitutes to traditional 
medicine will be sought. Where substitutes are not readily available, 
alternative markets may result. 16 The market for medical services is 
unique because of information asymmetries. Health care consumers 
must rely heavily on medical providers to prescribe the services they 
require. Thus, to some extent, physicians and other providers control 
the demand and the supply of care. 
Research in health economics supports the notion that physicians 
may have a target or required income and that they act as profit maxi-
mizers (Ligon, 1994; Pauly, 1986). As a consequence, the imposition of 
a fee cap per service may alter physician behavior. Specifically, physi-
cians may encourage so-called bracket creep where, instead of charging 
for a limited office visit, they charge for a comprehensive visit. In ad-
dition, physicians may resort to unbundling or billing for each specific 
service rather than grouping the services together. Given the prohibi-
tion on injured worker cost sharing in workers' compensation, these 
practices will erode the potential savings of the fee schedule. 
16This is not to suggest that black markets for medical care necessarily will develop 
as a result of price ceilings; the availability of substitute goods in the form of other 
diagnoses and treatments most likely will be affected. The point is to illustrate that 
alternative markets will develop to satisfy the demand. In the context of other types 
of regulation of medical care (notaNy the prohibition of certain medical procedures or 
services) black markets do develop. Examples include cancer treatments or abortions. 
Durbin and Llewellyn: Workers' Compensation 91 
The federal government explicitly recognized this phenomenon in 
its imposition of the resource-based relative value schedule used in 
Medicare. Essentially, the federal government, based on a review of 
the health care economics literature (Federal Register, November 1991), 
estimated that as much as 50 percent of the anticipated fee schedule 
savings may be eroded and that the volume of services may be increased 
to at least partially offset the effect of the price cap. 
There are two relevant studies that are workers' compensation spe-
cific. One conducted by the California Workers' Compensation Institute 
(1992) found that costs rose as a result of the imposition of a fee sched-
ule. A more recent study by Roberts and Zonia (1994) corroborates the 
literature cited by the federal government. They found that in response 
to fee schedules, health care providers "tend to provide more complex 
procedures in a shorter period of time and tend to exploit ambiguities 
allowed under the fee schedule." 
Because the above empirical analysis makes no explicit adjustments 
for the likely behavioral changes that may erode the savings potential, 
it may be appropriate to adjust the maximum savings level. For illus-
trative purposes, if a 50 percent adjustment factor similar to the one 
used by the federal government in RBRVS evaluations is applied in the 
hypothetical example, the anticipated overall workers' compensation 
system savings becomes 2.6 percent. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper provides a framework for evaluating the impact of im-
posing medical fee schedules on provider services. The methodology is 
straightforward. The constraints are data availability constraints rather 
than methodological constraints. In some (rare) instances states have 
detailed medical service data available on use and prices per CPT per 
injured workers. (Calendar year or fiscal year data are the only way 
data are captured.) If either piece of information is not available, then 
the analyst must rely on reasonable proxies. 
Three pieces of information are required: frequency or expenditure 
weights per CPT; proportion of medical costs covered by the schedule; 
and a measure of current market prices - either VCR if evaluating a new 
fee schedule or information regarding the old fee schedule if evaluating 
a change in the fee schedule. Any schedules using relative values and 
conversion factors must be translated into dollar terms. 
The NCCI methodology relies on a basket of services rendered to in-
jured workers and further splits workers' compensation medical costs 
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into some general categories. This information is compiled from avail-
able data sources that, while generally suitable, may not be appropriate 
in all situations. In addition, the analyst must rely to a certain extent 
on judgment of the likely utilization offsets that will occur. Available 
research provides a guideline to probable behavioral changes. 
Fee schedule design issues are important. The methodology pre-
sented will permit analysts to evaluate alternative scenarios, thereby 
providing policymakers and other workers' compensation insurance in-
terested parties with benchmark information. 
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» <;0 Table 1 "0 ..I::>. 
Fee Schedule Analysis "0 ([) 
Group = Medicine ::::l 0.. 
CPT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) >< 
90782 5,514 11.82 36.4428 9.811 15.225 $83,952 $61,139 $22,813 27.17 
90843 5,688 * * * 63.190 $359,425 $359,425 $0 0.00 
90844 57,995 * * * 85.362 $4,950,569 $4,950,569 $0 0.00 
'-
90853 5,052 * * * 55.430 $280,032 $280,032 $0 0.00 0 c 
90900 5,598 * * * 55.713 $311,880 $311,880 $0 0.00 ..... ::l 
$l) 
90915 6,964 * * * 55.713 $387,983 $387,983 $0 0.00 -0 
95860 11,717 142.97 65.8729 104.327 135.040 $1,582,259 $1,376,924 $205,335 12.98 ...., 
» 
95861 6,279 188.12 46.2437 155.320 221.465 $1,390,578 $1,085,967 $304,611 21.91 n 
.... 
95900 39,666 55.90 36.7641 47.827 71.301 $2,828,222 $2,099,596 $728,626 25.76 c $l) 
$1,719,350 $976,957 $742,394 43.18 ~. 95904 24,114 40.85 5.4220 34.655 71.301 ~ 
99025 17,749 30.10 53.8303 23.985 33.784 $599,631 $475,824 $123,807 20.65 
" ..... 
99075 14,307 * * * 307.127 $4,394,062 $4,394,062 $0 0.00 $l) n 
.... 
99201 7,603 35.47 37.5369 30.755 38.312 $291,283 $256,221 $35,062 12.04 n 
-(I) 
99202 131,439 44.07 36.5284 38.177 47.751 $6,276,311 $5,509,560 $766,752 12.22 < 
99203 81,344 62.35 56.4976 53.186 62.187 $5,058,542 $4,650,640 $407,902 8.06 0 
99204 11,871 75.25 20.5213 65.017 88.839 $1,054,603 $868,365 $186,238 17.66 N 
99205 93,463 133.30 75.9654 108.538 119.932 $11,209,216 $10,700,563 $508,654 4.54 Z 
99211 16,257 24.72 75.7813 20.230 22.210 $361,062 $346,563 $14,499 4.02 0 
99212 165,229 33.32 64.6289 27.789 31.561 $5,214,807 $4,914,835 $299,971 5.75 
99213 492,230 38.70 46.4705 33.596 40.328 $19,850,678 $17,881,771 $1,968,907 9.92 1.0 
99214 478,593 50.52 22.7081 43.825 58.446 $27,972,064 $23,450,905 $4,521,160 16.16 1.0 ~ 
99215 176,853 74.17 13.7014 64.763 93.514 $16,538,290 $12,889,237 $3,649,053 22.06 
99223 15,727 133.30 55.8102 110.784 140.107 $2,203,470 $1,898,781 $304,689 13.83 
99231 27,968 37.62 35.1822 32.709 44.672 $1,249,385 $1,003,833 $245,552 19.65 
99232 21,322 48.37 24.2045 42.196 60.916 $1,298,857 $999,481 $299,376 23.05 
99233 8,302 64.50 11.9282 55.509 89.852 $745,947 $526,575 $219,372 29.41 
99238 8,348 59.12 47.3425 50.676 65.993 $550,907 $460,161 $90,746 16.47 
99243 11,399 * ;, * 106.618 $1,215,335 $1,215,335 $0 0.00 
99244 37,195 * * * 141.801 $5,274,306 $5,274,306 $0 0.00 
99245 36,646 * * * 182.316 $6,681,159 $6,681,159 $0 0.00 
99281 20,726 34.40 17.9612 28.177 47.169 $977,627 $689,810 $287,817 29.44 
99282 56,669 46.22 20.7523 37.388 60.473 $3,426,957 $2,515,375 $911,583 26.60 
99283 50,132 56.97 9.0695 47.194 90.710 $4,547,466 $2,811,570 $1,735,896 38.17 
99284 11,197 69.87 4.2828 58.738 136.669 $1,530,288 $776,996 $753,292 49.23 
Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) NCCI Frequency; (2) Maximum Fee; (3) Maximum Fee Percentile; (4) UCRP Average up to the 
Maximum Fee Percentile; (5) Overall UCRP Average; (6) Estimated Old Costs; (7) Estimated New Costs; (8) Estimated Savings; and (9) Estimated 
Savings as a Percentage of Estimated Old Costs. 
Estimated New Costs = [(I)x(3)x(4)]+ [(100% - (3»x(l)x (2)]. 
* denotes a "missing" value. 
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Table 2 
Workers' Compensation Fee Schedule Analysis: 
Effect on Overall System Costs 
Total Total Total 
NCCI Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Group Frequency Old Costs New Costs Savings 
Medicine 2,161,156 $142,416,503 $123,082,397 $19,334,106 
Phys. Med.* 4,435,507 $111,640,859 $94,398,533 $17,242,326 
Radiology 651,524 $88,641,538 $60,125,246 $28,516,292 
Surgery 282,239 $140,650,077 $116,490,967 $24,159,110 
Pathology 200,365 $4,679,678 $2,921,047 $1,758,631 
Total 7,730,791 $488,028,655 $397,018,190 $91,010,465 
*Phys, Med. = Physical Medicine. 
Percent Savings of Physician Costs: (from Total) 
Physician Average Costs as a Percentage of Total Workers' Compo Medical Costs (from Table 3 ) 
Percent Savings of Total Medical Costs (0.0903 = 0.1865 x 0.4841) 
Medical Costs as Percent of Total Workers' Compensation System Costs (hypothetical value) 
Percent Savings of Total System Costs (0.0524 = 0.0903 x 0.58 ) 
Total 
Estimated 
Savings (%) 
13.58% 
15.44% 
32.17% 
17.18% 
37.58% 
18.65% 
18.65% 
48.41% 
9.03% 
58.00% 
5.24% 
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Durbin and Llewellyn: Workers' Compensation 
Table 3 
Distribution of Workers' Compensation Medical Costs 
Source Physicians Hospitals Others 
NCCI Special Medical Study 57.80% 39.30% 2.90% 
NCCI Closed Claim Study 44.53% 48.77% 6.70% 
HCFN 46.01% 50.31% 3.68% 
NCIe 45.30% 52.00% 2.70% 
Average 48.41% 47.59% 4.00% 
iHCFA = Health Care Financing Administration; administrative costs have been 
deleted from the HCFA data. 
2NCIC = North Carolina Industrial Commission 
Table 4 
Calculation of RBRVS Fee Schedule Amounts 
1994 1994 Geographic Practice 
Conversion Factors Cost Index Value 
IVA CFV Area Work PE MP 
P $33.718 R1 1.053 1.139 1.231 
S $35.158 R2 0.947 0.912 0.716 
N $32.905 R3 0.956 0.980 0.716 
Note: Colunm headings are as follows: IVA = Indicator Value; CFV = Conversion 
Factor Value; PE = Practice Expense; and MP = Malpractice; 
Under colunm (IVA), the notation is as follows: P = Primary Care Services; 
S = Surgical Procedures; and N = Other Nonsurgical Services. 
Under colunm (Area): R1 = Region 1; R2 = Region 2; and R3 = Rest of the State. 
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Table 5 
Calculation of RBRVS Fee Schedule Amounts 
RVUs Geographically Adjusted RVUs 
CPT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
22102 S 8.88 4.43 0.63 Rl 9.351 5.046 0.776 
R2 8.409 4.040 0.451 
R3 8.489 4.341 0.451 
63064 S 23.49 24.1 4.14 Rl 24.735 27.450 5.096 
R2 22.245 21.979 2.964 
R3 22.456 23.618 2.964 
99202 P 0.76 0.46 0.05 Rl 0.800 0.524 0.062 
R2 0.720 0.420 0.036 
R3 0.727 0.451 0.036 
99215 P 1.53 0.77 0.07 Rl 1.611 0.877 0.086 
R2 1.449 0.702 0.050 
R3 1.463 0.755 0.050 
(9) (10) 
15.172 $533.42 
12.901 $453.56 
13.282 $466.96 
57.281 $2,013.89 
47.188 $1,659.05 
49.039 $1,724.10 
1.386 $46.73 
1.175 $39.62 
1.213 $40.91 
2.574 $86.80 
2.201 $74.22 
2.267 $76.45 
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99252 N 1.14 0.77 0.09 Rl 1.200 0.877 0.111 2.188 $72.00 
R2 1.080 0.702 0.064 1.846 $60.75 
R3 1.090 0.755 0.064 1.909 $62.81 
72114 N 0.36 1.31 0.09 Rl 0.379 1.492 0.111 1.982 $65.22 
R2 0.341 1.195 0.064 1.600 $52.65 
R3 0.344 1.284 0.064 1.692 $55.69 
Notes: Column headings are as follows: (1) Indicator; (2) Work; (3) Practice Expense; (4) Malpractice; (5) Area; (6) Work; (7) Practice Expense; 
(8) Malpractice; (9) Total; (10) RBRVS Fee. 
In column (5), R1 = Region 1; R2 = Region 2; and R3 = Rest of the State. 
o 
c 
..... 
a-
::J 
SlJ 
::J 
0.. 
C 
ro 
:E 
ro 
-< 
::J 
~ 
..... 
" ro 
..... 
V> 
n 
o 
3 
u 
ro 
::J 
V> 
SlJ 
!:!. 
o 
::J 
CD 
CD 

